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Institute for Language, Cognition and Computation, 
School of Informatics 
University of Edinburgh 
 
Abstract:  The paper begins by examining the original Turing Test (2T) and Searle’s 
antithetical Chinese Room Argument, which is intended to refute the 2T in particular, 
as well as any formal or abstract procedural theory of the mind in general. In the 
ensuing dispute between Searle and his own critics, I argue that Searle's ‘internalist’ 
strategy is unable to deflect Dennett's combined robotic-systems reply and the allied 
Total Turing Test (3T). Many would hold that the 3T marks the culmination of the 
dialectic and, in principle, constitutes a fully adequate empirical standard for judging 
that an artifact is intelligent on a par with human beings. However, the paper carries 
the debate forward by arguing that the sociolinguistic factors highlighted in externalist 
views in the philosophy of language indicate the need for a fundamental shift in 
perspective in a Truly Total Turing Test (4T). It's not enough to focus on Dennett's 
individual robot viewed as a system; instead, we need to focus on an ongoing system 
of such artifacts. Hence a 4T should evaluate the general category of cognitive 
organization under investigation, rather than the performance of single specimens. 
From this comprehensive standpoint, the question is not whether an individual 
instance could simulate intelligent behavior within the context of a pre-existing 
sociolinguistic culture developed by the human cognitive type. Instead the key issue is 
whether the artificial cognitive type itself is capable of producing a comparable 
sociolinguistic medium.  
 
Keywords: artificial intelligence; Chinese room argument; computational theory of 
mind; mental content; semantic externalism; Turing tests. 
 
1.   The Turing Test and ‘Strong’ AI 
What would be required for a computational artifact to count as genuinely intelligent 
in a manner comparable to human beings?  Turing (1950) famously proposed an 
answer to this question, and the controversy launched by his position is still 
underway. Turing replaced his opening question ‘Can (or could) a machine think?’ 
with the more precise and empirically tractable question ‘Can (or could) a machine 
pass a certain type of test?’, where the test criteria are framed in terms of behaviour 
that is typically held to signify intelligence in the case of human beings. In particular, 
the original ‘Turing Test’ (2T) is based entirely on linguistic inputs and outputs. 
Linguistic performance is an apt choice as a pivotal criterion of intelligence, since 
human language is perhaps our most distinctive feature as cognitive agents, and is an 
essential medium through which most of our high level mental achievements are 
developed and expressed. Hence human language will retain a central role throughout 
the ensuing discussion 
 
In brief, (the standardized version of) Turing’s test is an ‘imitation game’ involving 
three players: a computational artifact and two humans. One of the humans is the 
‘judge’ and can pose questions to the remaining two players, where the goal of the 
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game is for the questioner to determine which of the two respondents is the computer. 
If, after a set amount of time, the questioner guesses correctly, then the machine loses 
the game, and if the questioner is wrong then the machine wins. Turing claimed, as a 
basic theoretical point, that any machine that could win the game a suitable number of 
times has passed the test and should be judged to be intelligent, in the sense that its 
behavioral performance has been demonstrated to be indistinguishable from that of a 
human being.    
Historically, there has been disagreement regarding the proper interpretation of 
Turing's position. Some have claimed that the 2T is proposed as an operational 
definition of intelligence (e.g. Block 1981, French 2000), and as such it has immediate 
and fundamental faults. However, in the current discussion I will adopt a weaker 
reading and interpret the test as comprising an empirically specifiable criterion for 
when intelligence can be legitimately ascribed to an artefact. On this reading, the 
main role of behavior is inductive or evidential rather than constitutive, and so 
behavioral tests for intelligence do not provide a necessary condition nor a reductive 
definition. At most, all that is warranted is a positive ascription of intelligence, if the 
test is adequate and the system passes. In the case of Turing's 1950 proposal, 
presumably the test is deemed adequate in terms of parity of input/output performance 
with human beings, and hence purports to employ the same operational standards that 
we tacitly adopt when ascribing intelligence to our fellow creatures.  
 
Turing's 1950 paper touches upon many fascinating topics and possibilities, the 
majority of which will not be considered in the following discussion. Instead, primary 
focus will be placed on the 'standardized' 2T as just delineated, in conjunction with 
selected developments and refinements of his seminal insight relating computation to 
mentality. Turing's original discussion places emphasis on the notion of a 
computational 'thinking machine' able to perform successfully in the verbal imitation 
game, while McCarthy's subsequent (1955) proposal, which introduced the term 
'Artificial Intelligence', is based on "the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any 
other feature of intelligence" can in principle be simulated by a computational artifact. 
Somewhat later, Newell and Simon (1976) made the much more explicit and powerful 
claim that "the necessary and sufficient condition for a physical system to exhibit 
general intelligent action is that it be a physical symbol system", i.e. a machine that 
produces and manipulates a changing collection of symbol structures.   
 
In line with this more comprehensive and explicit variation on the theme, Turing's 
original insight, which could potentially be construed in terms of a behavioristic 
engineering project, has now been transformed into a basic position in a revolutionary 
new science of intelligence. According to the widely embraced ‘computational 
paradigm’, which underpins cognitive science, Strong AI and various allied positions 
in the philosophy of mind, computation (of one sort or another) is held to provide the 
scientific key to explaining mentality in general and, ultimately, to reproducing it 
artificially. The paradigm maintains that cognitive processes are essentially 
computational processes, and hence that intelligence in the physical world arises when 
a material system implements the appropriate kind of computational formalism. So 
this broadly Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) holds that the mental states, 
properties and contents sustained by human beings are fundamentally computational 
in nature, and that computation, at least in principle, opens the possibility of creating 
artificial minds with comparable states, properties and contents.  
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2.   Searle's Critique   
Probably the most high profile criticism of the 2T in particular, along with strong AI 
and the CTM in general, is provided by Searle (1980), where he puts forward his 
celebrated Chinese Room Argument (CRA). Although the structure of his original 
thought experiment may seem deceptively simple and straightforward, both the 
overall target and the underlying polemical strategy of his argument are perhaps 
surprisingly less than transparent.
1
 The CRA is based on a hypothetical scenario in 
which Searle, a native speaker of English who knows no Chinese, is locked in a room 
with a massive rule-book written in English. Given Turing's 1950 exposition of digital 
computers, this is a very apt rendition of serving as a human implementation of a 
formal procedure. Searle receives Chinese inputs on bits of paper and mechanically 
follows the instruction manual to produce outputs in Chinese script. For the sake of 
argument, we are asked to suppose that the manual is so good that he is able to fool 
native speakers and pass a Chinese 2T.  
 
But Searle doesn’t understand Chinese, and doesn’t even know basic Chinese 
vocabulary. He’s just mechanically transforming arbitrary symbols according to a 
program of rules, while the inputs and outputs are, to him, totally meaningless. Hence 
Searle takes the CRA to refute the view that success at Turing's imitation game 
constitutes an adequate standard for the ascription of authentic intelligence, 
understanding or mental states, because in the hypothetical scenario he has passed a 
Chinese 2T while understanding nothing of Chinese. He also concludes that 
implementing a program with the requisite syntactical input/output profiles is 
theoretically inadequate as a criterion of intelligence. In direct opposition to Newell 
and Simon, Searle maintains that computation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for mentality, and so the general project of CTM and strong AI are 
summarily rejected, along with the Turing test.  
 
However, I would contend that the original CRA serves (at most) to refute only the 2T 
in particular, and not CTM or Strong AI in general, since acceptance of a 
computational theory of mind does not entail acceptance of the 2T. Many of Turing’s 
successors in the fields of cognitive science and artificial intelligence would endorse a 
broad version of the computational paradigm, holding that mentality in the physical 
universe is to be explained via the realization of the right type of abstract formal 
procedure, without accepting the 2T as providing a sufficient condition for ascribing 
mentality or real intelligence to an artifact. The two themes are clearly separable, and 
it is possible to embrace a computational approach to the mind without accepting 
Turing’s original and quite minimalistic standard (this basic point is made, e.g., in 
Rey 2002). As will be explored later in the paper, one can advocate much more 
stringent criteria for the success of Strong AI than the mere verbal imitation game 
proposed by Turing.  
 
Moreover, from the comparatively narrow conclusion of the original CRA, viz., that 
successfully implementing a conjectured program for processing Chinese syntax does 
not constitute a sufficient condition for understanding Chinese, Searle makes a very 
brisk transition to the universally quantified assertion that there is no program or 
abstract formal procedure whatever, the implementation of which would be sufficient 
for true intelligence. Presumably, Searle's tacit supposition is that the CRA supplies a 
general recipe or template which can be readopted to fit and refute any given variation 
on the computationalist theme, and hence the basic CRA strategy is powerful enough 
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to establish his universal conclusion. But I will shortly argue that this supposition is 
incorrect. 
 
3.   The Systems Reply 
In the style of Turing’s 1950 article, Searle considers and dismisses a number of 
anticipated objections to his view, the first of which he dubs the ‘systems reply’. A 
defender of the computational theory of mind might argue that perhaps Searle in 
isolation doesn’t understand Chinese, but that’s not the point, because the whole 
system that produces the behavior – room plus manual plus Searle – does understand 
Chinese. Searle has a two pronged response to this objection. One prong is the 
‘homuncular’ claim that he is the only locus of understanding in the room, and if he 
doesn’t understand Chinese, then nothing else about the system does. As a bald 
assertion this certainly has a good deal of common sense appeal, although it clearly 
leaves something to be desired as an argument against those who would deny its truth. 
Searle's second prong is an ‘internalization’ tack: suppose Searle were gifted with a 
photographic memory, and could memorize the rule book. Then the entire set-up 
could be internalized, and Searle could perform the rule governed manipulations 
simply by consulting his memory, sitting outside under a tree. Searle himself would 
then be the whole system, but he still wouldn’t understand Chinese.  
 
At this stage I will withhold comment regarding the logical status of Searle's 
‘internalization’ strategy, but agree with his conclusion that the systems reply is 
unconvincing. In order to reach this conclusion, I would prefer to endorse Putnam’s 
(1981) critique of the 2T and reapply it to the systems defense. Putnam argues that 
passing Turing's original test is not a sufficient condition for concluding that the 
computer genuinely understands or refers to anything with the strings of symbols it 
produces, because the computer doesn’t have the right sort of relations and 
interactions with the objects and states of affairs in the real world that its words are 
supposed to be about.  To illustrate the point; if the computer has no eyes, no hands, 
no mouth, and has never seen or eaten anything, then it is not talking about 
hamburgers when its program generates the string of English symbols ‘h-a-m-b-u-r-g-
e-r-s’ – it’s merely operating inside a closed loop of syntax. In terms of the original 
CRA scenario, the systems reply is inadequate because the system in question is 
incapable of doing the right sorts of things. 
 
In sharp contrast, our talk of hamburgers is intimately connected to nonverbal 
transactions with the objects of reference. There are ‘language entry rules’ taking us 
from nonverbal stimuli to appropriate linguistic behaviours. When given the visual 
stimulus of being presented with a pizza, a taco and a kebab, we can produce the 
salient utterance "Those particular foodstuffs are not hamburgers". And there are 
‘language exit rules’ taking us from linguistic expressions to appropriate nonverbal 
actions. For example, we can follow complex verbal instructions and produce the 
indicated patterns of behavior, such as finding the nearest Burger King on the basis of 
a description of its location in spoken English. Mastery of both of these types of rules 
is essential for deeming that a human agent understands natural language and is using 
expressions in a correct and referential manner - and the hapless 2T computer lacks 
both, as does the entire CRA set-up when viewed as a system.  
 
4.   The Total Turing Test  
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Hence the standard 2T is fundamentally inadequate as a test for understanding, 
because the range of behaviour it takes into account is far too limited. It relies solely 
on verbal input/output patterns, and these alone are not sufficient to evince a correct 
interpretation of the manipulated strings. Language is primarily about extra-linguistic 
entities and states of affairs, and there is nothing in a cleverly designed program for 
pure syntax manipulation which allows it to break free of this closed loop of symbols 
and demonstrate a proper correlation between word and object. As Dennett (1980) 
observed in his original peer commentary on Searle's argument, such 'bed-ridden' 
programs are far too weak to underwrite any positive inferences. When it comes to 
judging human language users in normal contexts, we rely on a far richer domain of 
evidence. And this critically undermines the notion that the standard 2T is justified on 
the basis that it relies on evidential parity with our practices in ascribing mentalistic 
predicates to our fellow creatures.
2
    
 
Even when the primary focus of investigation is language proficiency and 
comprehension, sheer linguistic input/output data is not enough. The inherent 
limitations of mere conversational performance naturally suggest a strengthening of 
the 2T, later named the Total Turing Test (3T) by Harnad (1991), wherein the 
repertoire of relevant behavior is expanded to include the full range of intelligent 
human activities. This will require that the computational procedures respond to and 
control not simply a teletype system for written inputs and outputs, but rather a well 
crafted artificial body. Thus in the 3T the scrutinized artifact is a robot, and the data to 
be tested coincide with the full spectrum of behaviors of which human beings are 
normally capable. In order to succeed, the 3T candidate must be able to do, in the real 
world of objects and people, everything that intelligent people can do. So perhaps the 
3T will appear to enjoy empirical symmetry with the human case and hence constitute 
a sufficient condition for attributing mentalistic predicates to artifacts? Harnad (and a 
great many others) certainly think so. Thus Harnad expresses a widely held view 
when he claims that the 3T is "...no less (nor more) exacting a test of having a mind 
than the means we already use with one another... there is no stronger test, short of 
being the candidate" (p.49). And, of course, the latter state of affairs is not an 
empirical option. 
 
At this stage, the incorporation of behavior in the actual world is motivated simply in 
terms of providing a more adequate standard of evidence for true understanding. 
When humans talk about hamburgers, we normally assume that they would be able to 
recognize one upon presentation, be able to distinguish a hamburger from a cheese 
omelette, etc. If this turned out not to be the case, then we would have good reason to 
doubt that they really understand the meaning of the word. However, this is not yet to 
invoke causal interactions with objects and substances in the environment in a 
particular theory of the semantics for natural language per se, which will occur in 
section 7.  
   
 
5.   The Robot Reply 
As it happens, the 3T is already anticipated by Searle in his 1980 article, and in his 
‘robot reply’ to the CRA he dismisses even this highly elevated criterion. As before, 
the first prong of Searle's rejoinder is ‘homuncular’; he augments the original CRA by 
supposing that he is still locked in the room, but now some of the Chinese characters 
he receives are codes for digitalized inputs from the robot’s sensory transducers, and 
some of the output symbols now control the motors inside the robot’s body and make 
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it move its arms and legs. Even so, all Searle is doing (perhaps remotely, from inside 
a control room), is manipulating uninterpreted syntax. He has no idea what is going 
on outside the control room and the manipulated syntax still has no intentional 
content. Searle cannot see the greasy hamburger that the robot’s photographic sensing 
apparatus has transduced into Chinese code, nor is he trying to grasp it by outputting 
the relevant effector code controlling the robotic hand.   
 
This is no doubt a plausible rendition of Searle's benighted predicament qua control 
room homunculus, but it invites the question as to why this should constitute a 
pertinent concern. And the question has now become much more pressing because, 
unlike the original 2T, a vast number of the pivotal inputs and outputs in this more 
demanding case are no longer directly present to Searle. In order to pass this 
combined linguistic and robotic test, the artifact must perform physical behaviors in 
accordance with the language entry and exit rules appropriate for a correct grasp of 
Chinese. Hence the relevant input/output boundaries for the system under appraisal 
extend far beyond Searle-the-homunculus. The robot’s sensing devices will comprise 
relevant input boundaries, while its artificial body and limbs will constitute the salient 
output interface for manifesting the scrutinized behaviour. Thus, a great many of the 
crucial inputs and outputs for the robot undergoing the 3T are no longer comprised by 
the symbols with which Searle has acquaintance. Instead, the formal expressions 
manipulated by Searle, as an executive  subunit, are fed in from and into various other 
modules of the robot's processing structure and are not themselves the inputs and 
outputs which form the basis of the test, and which constitute the evidence for the 
intended conclusion that the robot understands Chinese.  
 
Contrary to Searle's response to the anticipated robot reply, the conclusion of the 3T is 
not that a mere control room homunculus would understand Chinese. So if we apply 
the systems approach to the entire artifact that passes the 3T, as Dennett explicitly 
suggests in his original peer commentary, then Searle's preliminary rejoinder to the 
robot reply appears to be a non sequitur.
3
    
 
6.   The Robot as a System 
The 3T robotic-system is fundamentally disanalogous with the initial 2T/CRA 
scenario, yet Searle tries to address Dennett's sharpened objection by applying the 
same internalization strategy as before. In his author's response to Dennett's 
commentary, as well as in a later (1994) reply to Harnad, Searle attempts to break free 
of his homuncular confines by claiming that he could in principle realize the entire 
robotic system himself and still not understand Chinese. It's far from clear that this 
claim expresses a cogent theoretical possibility, so I will not belabor assorted 
variations on the fanciful set-up and try to adjudicate. The methodological value of 
the thought experiment has transgressed its boundaries and I will simply grant 
Searle’s far-fetched hypothesis for the sake of argument. If Searle could perhaps 
manage, in some arcane and convoluted manner, to realize the entire system and 
become the robot following its instructions, then we will concede that Searle himself, 
considered as a conscious subject, would not understand Chinese.  
 
Nevertheless, this still isn't enough to establish the desired conclusion, since it fails to 
demonstrate that the overall system doesn't understand Chinese. The attempted 
inference trades on an equivocation: ‘Searle’ the narrow center of conscious 
subjectivity is quite distinct from ‘Searle’ the body/brain complex viewed as an 
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objective and highly multifaceted arrangement of matter and energy. It is ‘Searle’ 
under this latter description that implements the robot, while it is ‘Searle’ under the 
former description who does not understand Chinese. Yet there are plainly many 
aspects, properties and attributes of ‘Searle’ the complex dynamical system which are 
not applicable to ‘Searle’ the conscious subject. For example: Searle the conscious 
subject is not himself able to follow instructions in spoken Chinese and behave in the 
indicated manner (because, granting Searle his own point, he doesn't understand any 
Chinese). Hence, if given the instruction in Chinese to raise his right hand and hop on 
his left foot,  Searle the conscious subject does not possess the ability to process the 
instruction and perform the appropriate action. However, Searle-the-complex-system 
can process the instruction and perform the indicated behavior, as evidenced by the 
robot's ability to pass the salient Turing test. So from the fact that Searle the 
homunculus does not possess a given property or attribute it does not follow that 
Searle-the-system does not. Hence the form of Searle's proffered counterargument is 
logically invalid and his conclusion does not follow from the premises.  
  
I would therefore contend that Searle has failed to provide a successful 
counterexample to the claim that passing the 3T is a sufficient condition for 
attributing  intelligence or understanding to the overall system under scrutiny, and 
hence that Searle’s introspective considerations are not able to deflect Dennett's 
combined robotic-systems reply. So at this point in the debate ultimately stemming 
from Turing's 1950 proposal, the CRA-type strategy can make no further progress. 
Searle's internalist approach serves, at most, to refute the adequacy of the original 2T, 
and cannot be generalized to the vastly strengthened sensorimotor version of the test. 
Hence the CRA alone does not provide a template which can be readopted to fit and 
refute any given variation on the computationalist theme. Searle's general anti-
computationalist conclusion requires additional theoretical machinery for its defense.
4
  
 
Of course, the failure of a purported counterexample does not in itself imply that the 
positive claim endorsed by Searle's opposition has been confirmed.
5
 But given the 
highly elevated standards of the new test, along with the inadequacy of Searle's 
attempted rebuttal, the onus would now seem to lie in the other court. Indeed, many 
would hold that the 3T marks the culmination of the dialectic and, at least in principle, 
constitutes a fully adequate empirical standard for judging that an artifact possesses 
genuine mentality.  
 
However, I will now attempt to advance the debate by moving in a direction away 
from the restrictive internalism of the CRA. Two fundamental tenets underlying 
Searle's view are that (a) minds have mental contents (semantics), while (b) 
computational syntax, by itself, is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics. 
The real driving force behind the CRA is to serve as a polemical tool in support of (b).  
The trouble is that in the 3T we are no longer dealing with computational syntax, by 
itself. Instead, we are dealing with a fully functioning robot able to behave in a 
manner indistinguishable from a human being, and hence which seems to evince a 
correct interpretation of the manipulated strings. In rejecting the sufficiency of the 
original 2T, I've agreed with Dennett and Putnam that mastery of the appropriate 
language entry and language exit rules is a necessary condition for an adequate test of 
artificial intelligence. But is mere behavioral success on its own sufficient? 
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In the remainder of the paper I will retain Searle's insistence on meaning as essential 
to mentality, as expressed in his fundamental tenet (a) above, but replace his 
'psychologistic' version of semantics with the less traditional externalist view. This 
shift in semantic theory yields some interesting implications both for AI and for a 
strengthened Turing test. I will try to move the debate forward by exploring some key 
features of externalism which I think cast serious doubt on the idea that a behaviorally 
successful 3T robot understands language in a manner at all comparable with the 
paradigmatic human case, and that the expressions generated by the computational 
artifact are genuinely referential. Finally, I will argue that the sociolinguistic factors 
highlighted in externalist views indicate the need for a fundamental shift in 
perspective. It's not enough to focus on Dennett's individual 3T robot viewed as a 
system; instead, a Truly Total Turing Test (4T) needs to focus on an ongoing system 
of such artifacts. Hence my overall conclusion will be that the 3T is still too weak, and 
that a truly comprehensive test should evaluate the general category of cognitive 
organization under investigation, rather than the performance of single specimens. 
 
7.   Semantic Externalism  
Externalist views in the theory of meaning and reference first put forward by Kripke 
(1972), Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979) highlight essential features of natural 
language (NL) semantics not present in the case of the 3T artifact as currently 
depicted. The conclusion of Putnam’s highly influential Twin Earth Argument (TEA) 
is that the internal cognitive states of individual language users radically 
underdetermine linguistic meaning – generally, there’s nothing ‘in the head’ strong 
enough to fix reference for terms in natural language. According to this view, no mere 
internal configuration of a cognitive system, be it computational, neurophysiological 
or conscious/phenomenal, is able to capture the intended objects of linguistic 
reference. Hence the representational capacities of internal states are, in the general 
case, too weak to support the referential burdens of natural language.  
 
On Putnam’s account, the naive ‘psychologistic’ approach is fatally flawed because it 
ignores two essential aspects of meaning and reference. One (1) is the role of direct 
causal interaction with the environment when language is acquired and used: natural 
kind terms such as ‘water’, ‘aluminum’, ‘gold’, ‘tiger’, etc., make indexical appeal to 
actual specimens or paradigm cases in the world – so causal relations via perception, 
demonstrative pointing and utterance production in the intersubjectively accessible 
public domain determine what these words actually refer to. There is no internal 
encoding or representational state sustained by the individual agent that is powerful 
enough to do this.  
 
Second (2), the traditional internalist approach ignores what Putnam calls the 
‘division of linguistic labor’, epitomized by the reliance on experts who set the 
standards for the entire linguistic community and underwrite the reference relation in 
cases where relevant microstructures and/or objective membership conditions are 
known. It is by acquiring a natural language within a particular sociolinguistic 
community and using it within this shared framework that we are able to refer 
successfully. For example, the average English speaker can use the word ‘gold’ to talk 
about the actual substance, even though they may not know the periodic table, may 
not know that gold is the element with atomic number 79, and probably don’t know in 
practice how to distinguish real gold from, say, chalcopyrite. Most people have had 
causal/perceptual interactions with samples of the metal itself, and thereby have direct 
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indexical access to the substance the word names. But the precise technical details of 
the extension of ‘gold’ are uncovered by relevant experts in the field, and it is upon 
their expertise that our linguistic practice implicitly depends, and not upon our own 
internal representations, concepts or psychological states. ‘Gold’ patently does not 
mean ‘any arbitrary material with a set of phenomenal characteristics such that my 
subjective concepts or representational capacities are not able to distinguish it from 
the element with atomic number 79’.    
 
And such externalist criteria cannot be felicitously detached from, nor be rejected as 
irrelevant to, an individual's NL understanding. If someone, say Arnold, were to claim 
that the above disjunction is what he means, then Arnold would be open to the charge 
that when he uses the word 'gold' in that manner he is no longer speaking English. 
Furthermore, these externalist criteria are also basic to linguistic communication, 
since, e.g. two agents cannot communicate if they are not even talking about the same 
things when using the same words. Hence if I am unaware of the non-standard aspects 
of Arnold's ideolect, then he and I fail to communicate whenever either of us uses the 
word 'gold'. And clearly these observations about 'gold' generalize across the entire 
English language.  
 
Kripke first argued for externalist factors in the case of proper names, where the 
referent is not determined by a definite description or ‘cognitive content’ entertained 
by the language user, but rather is historically anchored in a brute association between 
name and individual, and where a causal chain of social practice preserves the 
correlation established through this ‘initial baptism’. As above, Putnam extends the 
analysis to include natural kind terms such as ‘gold’ and ‘water’, while Burge extends 
it even further to include a host of conventional taxonomic kind terms like ‘arthritis’, 
‘sofa’, ‘contract’, ‘brisket’, etc. The semantic reliance on factors outside the bounds of 
the individual language user thus appears to be an indispensable and ubiquitous 
feature of NL. In short, language is a communal, historically evolved phenomenon, 
where the meaning of words is not determined by individual representations or 
internal states, but is a public, external matter, determined by objective 
microstructural regularities, causal chains, relevant experts and accepted practices in 
one's sociolinguistic clan. Putnam concludes that we must give up the view that 
meanings are concepts or mental entities of any kind. According to his famous adage, 
"Slice the pie any way you like, meanings just ain’t in the head."  
 
8. Robotic Reference 
But if meanings ain’t in the heads of individual human agents, then they’re certainly 
not in the data bases of computational artefacts. So, in light of (1) above, if the 3T 
robot’s natural language capabilities are simply installed as part of its overall 
program, then it will not have the necessary history of causal interactions with the 
objects of reference, and its symbolic activities will remain semantically ungrounded. 
On the foregoing widely accepted model of ‘direct’ reference, there is an essential 
causal and chronological link that semantically tethers an individual’s linguistic 
behaviour to its environmental context. The relation of reference is founded on a 
history of causal interactions between the agent and the entities and states of affairs in 
the world that it uses language to talk about, where salient aspects of the external 
world have causally impinged upon the agent. The word ‘water’ as used by typical 
human beings is intimately linked to a long history of associations based on 
experiences of seeing, drinking, washing with, and being immersed in various 
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samples of environmental H2O, where these experiences are all caused by the liquid 
itself, giving the agent direct indexical access to water, as the word was acquired and 
integrated into its overall linguistic framework.  
 
At the moment it’s obviously rather difficult to envision exactly how a robot might be 
designed to pass the 3T. But if the computational core of its abilities were simply 
implanted via some sophisticated natural language processing (NLP) software, in 
combination with vast data bases, world models, etc., then the concomitant lack of an 
historical chain of interaction with the real world poses a serious theoretical question 
regarding the semantic import of its linguistic outputs. When a token of the term 
‘water’ is emitted by the robot, all shiny and fresh off the assembly line, how could it 
possibly mean ‘the liquid with the same underlying microstructure as the stuff in the 
environment that I've interacted with when I acquired the word’? If the robot has not 
yet had any physical interactions with actual water, then it would seem to be 
semantically no better off than the original 2T computer, encased in a closed loop of 
syntax.  
 
However, the issue becomes more subtle. Turing's original test has been deemed 
inadequate because it fails to incorporate vital behavioral data in terms of the 
language entry and exit rules basic to demonstrating a veridical grasp of NL, and this 
has motivated the transition to the robotic 3T currently at issue. This is an operational 
consideration based on the behavioral evidence required to judge whether or not a 
given system can be said to understand a particular language, and as such it is not tied 
to any more detailed theory of NL semantics per se. In contrast, externalism 
constitutes a very specific position in the philosophical analysis of meaning and 
reference, and one which places vital emphasis on causal interactions between 
language user and world. So in this sense, the two strands may begin to superimpose. 
In order to pass the Total Turing Test, the robot must also behave in all the 
appropriate manners with its artificial body, and after it’s been around for awhile it 
will have acquired its own personal history of causal interactions with water - and 
then the theoretical waters will become muddied. It seems clear that when the robot is 
taken fresh off the assembly line its linguistic outputs will lack a requisite external 
referent, as in the original 2T scenario. But after prolonged bodily and verbal actions 
performed in the real world, as demanded by the 3T in order to demonstrate a genuine 
grasp of English, it seems that a case could perhaps then be made for proper 
semantical grounding. 
 
So I do not present the issue of (1) as an insurmountable obstacle nor a conclusive, in 
principle objection, but rather as an interesting and potentially important case of 
dissimilarity with the semantic analysis of naturally occurring cognitive systems. 
Indeed, it might turn out to be impossible to construct an artifact capable of passing 
the 3T without first training it to use language in the real world and thereby providing 
the requisite history of causal interactions.
6
  So the issues raised by (1) are perhaps not 
insuperable. However, I think that the sociolinguistic aspects invoked in the division 
of linguistic labor in (2) above underpins a much more serious difficulty when 
evaluating the robot, and one which, even if it could possibly be overcome in the case 
of an individual artifact, nevertheless suggests that this would still not be enough to 
attain full parity with the overall performance capacities of human cognitive 
architecture. Hence the ramifications of factor (2) will then serve to motivate the 
claim that even the combined linguistic/robotic 3T is intrinsically too limited, and that 
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a conceptual shift in goal posts is required for a Truly Total Turing Test. But first 
factor (2) itself will be explored in more detail.      
 
9.   The Sociolinguistic Community 
In line with the foregoing observations regarding the central role of linguistic culture, 
in order for the robot’s linguistic activities to be genuinely referential, the robot would 
have to acquire its linguistic fluency through interaction not just with the environment 
as required by factor (1), but as a member of the relevant sociolinguistic community. 
And again, this is very different than having its language processing abilities simply 
implanted as a formal program, particularly if this program were predesigned in terms 
of some chosen external target language(s).  
If the robot did not learn its language via extended participation with an actual and 
embodied linguistic culture, within a shared physical and social context, then it will 
not be a valid member of any such community, and consequently it will be unable to 
rely upon the historical chains of name use, division of linguistic labor and other 
cultural practices central to our referential success. Putnam gives the analogy that 
natural language is not like a hammer, a tool that can be wielded successfully by an 
individual. Instead, language is a cooperative social venture, more like operating a 
steam ship or perhaps a large industry. As bone fide members of the English speaking 
‘linguistic cooperative’, we’re automatically plugged in to this ancient and highly 
structured communication system, a living cognitive network through which we 
inherit and access the meaning of our words. 
For the linguistic activities of single human beings to be semantically grounded, the 
individuals must belong to and participate in such a communication network, a 
network that is anchored to a continuous presence extended in real time and space. 
People first have direct causal interactions with various persons, places, objects and 
natural kinds in their immediate surroundings, and by learning and exercising their 
linguistic behaviours in this shared environment, they enjoy direct indexical access to 
the referents of the corresponding terms. But via full membership in this same NL 
community, they also gain linguistic access to people, places, objects, substances and 
states of affairs remote in both time and space. I’ve never been to Madagascar, and 
Isaac Newton died long before I was born. Nonetheless, through membership in the 
English speaking NL sociolinguistic coop, I’m plugged into this ongoing, far reaching 
and exceedingly powerful communication network, and am able to use English words 
to successfully talk about Isaac Newton and Madagascar, even though I’ve been in 
direct personal contact with neither. 
However, if the 3T robot’s English capabilities are simply installed as part of some 
highly sophisticated NLP software package, then it will lack the essential history of 
having acquired these abilities through interaction with and participation in an actual, 
embodied community. Its ‘semantics’ will be purely internal and solipsistic, generated 
from files stored in its data bases and various coded representations supplied by its 
designers. And as Putnam’s TEA convincingly shows, such internal states and 
structures are incapable of determining the reference relation for even such basic 
natural kind terms as ‘water’.  
So the issue at hand does not concern the bare mechanics of how one might design 
and build a computational artifact with the behavioral capacities to pass the 3T. 
Granted, such an engineering project will dwell on the occurrent and real-time 
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abilities, structural properties and causal powers of the physical device. Instead, the 
issue is one of subsequent evaluation of the robot with respect to its semantic and 
mentalistic properties, such as genuine intelligence, understanding, reference for its 
linguistic outputs, and the attribution of associated mental states and contents such as 
believing that snow is white, knowing that water is H2O, wanting to pass the 3T, etc. 
And it is here that externalism, historicism and the sociolinguistic medium play a 
crucial role in both our conceptual framework and our actual practices. And, as will 
be argued below, it is also here that testing of the artificial type rather than just a token 
artifact is the salient level of analysis. 
 
Of course, in the same vein as noted above, the combined linguistic/robotic standards 
of the 3T would require the robot to have extended dealings with human beings while 
it was undergoing the test, and one might then argue that after it had been around for 
some time and had sufficient verbal and other behavioural interchanges with humans, 
it would itself gradually become a card carrying member of the English speaking 
sociolinguistic coop, with full rights and privileges.
7
 And while a case could perhaps 
be made that a successful 3T robot, fully integrated into human society, might 
eventually be deemed a legitimate member of the English speaking community, I will 
argue in sections 10. and 11. that the issue nonetheless points to a fundamental feature 
of human mentality that has been entirely neglected in the standard test scenarios, and 
which this form of mere integration would fail to address.        
 
But just to summarize the discussion so far; it's not a question of whether or not the 
robot can behave in a given sociolinguistic context in an appropriate manner and thus 
pass the combined linguistic and robotic 3T - we assume for the sake of argument that 
it can. Instead, the question concerns the conceptual adequacy of the 3T itself, and the 
main issue has been whether or not the robot's use of language is genuinely 
meaningful. Do its words refer, is it employing natural language to talk about 
extralinguistic objects and states of affairs, or is it merely producing syntactic strings 
as output in response to various surface stimuli in conjunction with cleverly designed 
internal models and formal recipes for symbol manipulation? Put in terms of the 
classic use/mention distinction in logic; is the artifact simply mentioning linguistic 
expressions, 'displaying' items of formal syntax with no semantic content,  or is it 
using these expressions in a robust and referential fashion? According to externalism, 
the latter question cannot be answered in the affirmative unless both conditions (1) 
and (2) above are satisfied. I do not argue that they cannot be satisfied, but merely that 
success at the 3T does not guarantee this. And in the following sections I will 
maintain that, even if they can be satisfied in the case of particular instances, this is 
still not enough for a truly comprehensive test.  
 
10. The Non-individualism of the Mental 
As stated above, the aim is not to explain and predict the behavior of the robot viewed 
as an ingenious piece of mechanical engineering. If the 3T is being used to test Strong 
AI's ultimate goal of creating a robot with an artificial mind, then this will require the 
successful application of our standard framework of mentalistic explanation to 
characterize and predict the robot's performance. In viewing a system qua mind, 
rather than just another complex physical or biological device, a crucial move is to 
apply the Belief–Desire (BD) framework of explanation paradigmatic of mental 
systems, wherein cognitive agents are seen as possessing a vast store of  propositional 
attitudes, which rationally combine via psychological processing to cause actions. 
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The well known basic scheme is to ascribe to the agent assorted beliefs and desires, 
where beliefs depict the way the world is and how things work, while desires supply 
goals – possible future states of the world that the agent wants to become actual. Then 
we explain/predict that (other things being equal) the system acts to achieve its desires 
in light of its beliefs. This constitutes what it means to be a rational mental agent. For 
example, if Mary walked to the bar because she wanted a shot of whisky and she 
believed that she could obtain one there, then that’s a perfectly full and complete 
account of her action. In terms of standard psychological explanation, the foregoing 
account is not in need of, nor is it improved by, the addition of further details 
concerning the neurophysiological substrate of Mary’s beliefs, the biomechanics of 
limb movement, the psychophysical correlations between the reception of 
electromagnetic radiation and Mary’s visual experiences that enable her to find the 
bar, etc. According to the canonical BD framework, rational actions are caused by 
propositional attitude states in virtue of the representational content of these states. 
And if, at the mental level of explanation, such actions are caused by states 
individuated in terms of their content, then appeal to these content laden states, rather 
than their mechanical underpinnings, is the salient mode of explanation and 
prediction. 
 
And it is here that the sociolinguistic dimension of semantic externalism begins to 
seriously impinge upon the more traditional preconceptions underlying both the 2T 
and 3T. As Burge perspicuously observes, the mental attributes and contents ascribed 
to individual agents depend in an essential manner on the practices and conventions of 
one's external sociolinguistic community. He supplies a number of counterfactual 
illustrations where an individual's mental contents differ while their entire physical 
and internal mental histories, viewed in isolation from their social context, remain the 
same. The differences in content stem from differences outside the individual 
"considered as an isolated physical organism, causal mechanism or seat of 
consciousness." In turn, such differences in content are normally taken to indicate 
differences in mental states and events. Burge's perhaps startling conclusion: various 
mental states and events are not fully determined by what’s going on in an 
individual's head. Instead, they rely in an inextricable manner on the encompassing 
sociolinguistic milieu. 
 
From this it follows that human mentality is essentially non-individualistic - it 
depends crucially upon a sociolinguistic context that transcends personal boundaries. 
The particular contents and hence the very identity of the mental events and 
propositional attitude states that characterize an agent are not wholly determined by 
what's going on internally. Instead, the identity of these states and events is 
inextricably dependent on the surrounding sociolinguistic medium. Similarly, this 
sociolinguistic medium is not a product of any human individual, but rather is the 
legacy of the human cognitive type. And this indicates that the phenomenon of 
mentality is, in a very fundamental sense, sustained at the type rather than the token 
level. Tokens of the human cognitive variety have the mental states and contents they 
do in virtue of their dependency upon the capabilities of the human cognitive type, 
where the type is responsible for the sociolinguistic medium in which the tokens are 
embedded.  
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And in turn, this indicates that tests for artificial intelligence and mentality that focus 
merely on the performance of single specimens are guilty of ignoring a fundamental 
aspect of the phenomenon in question. If the test is one for a genuine mind that has 
been artificially engendered, then the real standard should concern the capabilities of 
the synthetic cognitive type itself rather than token artifacts. And the issue becomes 
particularly acute given that the 3T simply presuppose human sociolinguistic culture 
as a background condition, as a starting point to which the artificial agent can adapt. 
But because of the non-individualism of the mental, the successful 3T robot is then, at 
best, not a case of purely artificial intelligence, but rather a curious hybrid: an artifact 
assimilating to a pre-existing background context produced and sustained by an alien 
cognitive kind, and where this alien human context makes an essential contribution to 
the attributed mental states and contents of the robot. The resulting form of 'mentality' 
is then a cognitive mongrel, a blend of both human and artificial elements. 
 
Thus a fundamental defect of the 3T, when construed as a test for a truly artificial 
mind, stems from the fact that the ascription and the very identity of the robot's 
mental states, events and contents is inextricably dependent on its sociolinguistic 
medium, which in this case has been produced by an entirely different and non-
artificial cognitive architecture. So when testing a purported case of genuinely 
artificial intelligence, the pertinent question becomes - is the artificial type capable of 
producing and sustaining this essential sociolinguistic medium? If not, then the 
ascription of mental states, events and contents to successful 3T tokens of this type is 
inescapably derivative, and the overall cognitive kind to which such tokens belong is 
not itself capable of supporting mentality in a manner equivalent to the capabilities of 
the human cognitive category. In terms of a Truly Total Turing Test (4T), the artificial 
type must be capable of autonomously generating the essential sociolinguistic 
medium, and not simply adapting to what the human kind has already produced.                            
 
So, following Burge, and contrary to the more naive traditional conception, basic 
mental phenomena such as propositional attitude states are not individualistic. But 
because the 2T and 3T are concerned only with artifact tokens, these tests are framed 
in purely individualistic terms, and tacitly assume from the outset a conception of 
mental contents and states which externalist considerations undermine. And it is 
salient to note that externalism itself is much more compatible with the basic 
'operational' methodology of Turing tests, because it does not appeal to Searle's 
internalist, homuncular features of an agent. Instead of relying on first person 
introspection, externalism is much more dependent on observation of the system from 
the outside, incorporating causal, behavioral, social and historical factors. And this 
reflects our actual practice in ascribing mentalistic states and properties to our fellow 
creatures. Our practice is based upon such factors as observed in the intersubjectively 
accessible domain, and does not make essential appeal to what might be going on 
inside someone else's head. And once the fundamental importance of the 
sociolinguistic medium is recognized, as brought into sharp focus by externalist 
considerations, then the individualistic standards built into the assorted versions of the 
Turing test as so far conceived must be replaced by operational considerations at the 
non-individualistic type level. Hence the deep-seated contribution of the 
sociolinguistic milieu highlights the need to shift the locus of scrutiny from an artifact 
token to the artificial cognitive type.  
 
11.   A Truly Total Turing Test 
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As argued above, semantic externalism provides some very strong considerations in 
support of the move from the token to the type level in a fully adequate test of 
artificial mentality. But the mere fact that both the 2T and 3T start out by 
presupposing human natural language as a background condition already indicates the 
need for this fundamental shift. Unless the type of cognitive architecture under 
scrutiny has the independent capacity to generate and sustain the kind of 
sociolinguistic context assumed as a starting point, then the test is still too weak. As 
an illustration of the basic conceptual need to test the overall category of cognitive 
architecture and not just the performance of individual specimens in a given and pre-
existing NL context, consider the following hypothetical scenario that does not in any 
way depend on semantic externalism. Suppose, purely for the sake of argument, that 
Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) are right, and that human cognitive processing takes place 
via an underlying symbolic Language of Thought (LOT). And suppose that an 
artificial neural network is developed which is so cunningly designed that it can be 
trained to exploit the external symbol system of human natural language, extract 
information and produce the requisite input/output patterns enabling it to pass the 3T.  
But imagine further (and still in line with Fodor and Pylyshyn) that this type of 
connectionist architecture, on its own, is totally incapable of generating the productive 
and systematic external symbol system of human NL, and the allied sociolinguistic 
culture, upon which its 3T success depends. Hence as a cognitive processing type it 
would fail the 4T, and its token success at the 3T would be wholly dependent upon 
exploiting a system of exterior cultural scaffolding which it is intrinsically unable to 
produce. In such a case, the 3T success of individual artifacts is clearly parasitic upon 
the pre-existence of the more advanced linguistic capabilities of the human cognitive 
type, and the natural conclusion to draw is that the artificial neural network does not 
possess capabilities fully equivalent to the human symbolic LOT architecture.     
 
As an indigenous phenomenon, human language use and linguistically characterized 
mental content depends on membership in a sociolinguistic community, and 
furthermore, one that has been created and is sustained by conspecifics: the successful 
linguistic and cognitive activities of human individuals are inseparable from 
immersion in an historically evolved culture of intelligence, where this culture is itself 
the product of human cognitive processing. So with the move to recognizing the 
fundamental importance of linguistic culture in intelligent human behavior goes a 
concomitant shift in emphasis from tokens to the level of the general cognitive kind. 
The capacities at the general type level are conceptually prior to the relevant features 
and capabilities of individual specimens.    
 
And this highlights a fundamental deficiency in the approach employed by Turing-
type tests as envisioned so far. In light of the foregoing, it is not theoretically 
sufficient for a comprehensive test of artificial intelligence to focus merely on the 
performance of individual artifacts. Instead, such a test should focus on the overall 
capabilities of the general cognitive category to which these tokens belong. So the 
manner in which the robotic 3T is designed still reveals a crucial disanalogy with the 
human case. Not only can individual human beings exhibit the salient patterns of 
verbal input/output behaviour required by the original Turing Test, and full blown 
mastery of the language entry and exit rules required by the combined linguistic and 
robotic Total Turing Test, but in addition it was the human cognitive type, to which 
such individual specimens belong, that has produced natural language and this 
advanced culture of intelligence in the first place. And it is with other tokens of this 
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same type that we are inter-twinned as a sociolinguistic community, and upon whom 
our referential success, as well as the very identity of our linguistically attributed 
mental states, co-depends. 
 
In stark contrast, the computational artifact involved in the 3T is not a member of this 
same type. It has an alien and artificial cognitive structure which is quite possibly 
incapable, at the type level, of ever producing natural language or the kind of 
sociolinguistic context which is a necessary background condition. Indeed, both NL 
itself as an advanced structural phenomenon, and the associated cultural and 
communicative network which engender it, are simply presupposed as a starting point 
for the 3T robot. And this indicates that a conceptual shift is required in order to 
frame a truly thorough test of artificial intelligence along the operational lines 
originally proposed by Turing. When it comes to rigorously evaluating the capabilities 
of an artificial cognitive architecture, it is not enough to scrutinize the performance of 
individual specimens. The question of genuine intelligence must advert to the type 
rather than the token level, since the performance of an isolated agent presupposes a 
social context which transcends the individual. As noted in section 9. above, after 
many years of behavioral interaction and social integration, a token of an alien 
cognitive type, such as an individual 3T robot, might become a naturalized member of 
some native NL community, and hence use human language in a semantically 
grounded manner. But the robot's referential success would then be parasitic upon a 
communal and linguistic framework produced by an entirely different kind of 
cognitive architecture, as would the very contents of its propositional attitude states 
used to explain and predict its behavior. Hence the salient capabilities of its own 
cognitive type would remain untested. What is required in a fully comprehensive 
examination of artificial mentality is evidence that a community of the robot's own 
conspecifics is capable of producing and sustaining the type of sociolinguistic 
medium that the 2T and 3T merely presuppose. 
 
So on these grounds Dennett's robotic, individual system reply to the CRA is still too 
weak to establish his positive view. The scrutinized 3T artifact is simply planted in a 
pre-existing natural language community, within a social context of intelligence 
produced by a radically different cognitive type - namely the same type as its 
designers! Because advanced human NL is assumed from the start, the behavioral 
capabilities of the robot can presuppose sophisticated, pre-structured linguistic inputs 
for free, and these can serve as triggers for appropriately complex responses. The 
cognitive architecture can thus be tailor made to allow success in a highly developed 
and specialized context, a context about which its designers have exhaustive 
foreknowledge, and one which quite possibly could never have been generated by the 
type of architecture in question. Thus we need to evaluate not only the capabilities of 
the artifact viewed as a system (as opposed to a mere control room homunculus), but 
also the capabilities of an ongoing system of such artifacts, to determine whether or 
not the type of cognitive architecture in question is able to produce the social medium 
of intelligence that is simply taken for granted as a background condition in the 3T.  
 
The cognitive processes that underpin the use of natural language in human begins are 
also the cognitive processes which created these languages to begin with. The initial 
inputs were the basic environmental stimuli available to prelinguistic creatures, and 
systems of tokens of the human cognitive type transformed these inputs, via a 
cooperative, interactive and incremental development, into the extremely rich and 
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subtle communication network currently sustained by human NL communities. Thus 
the successful 3T behavior of individuals artifacts, within a pre-existing 
sociolinguistic context (e.g. 20-21st century English speaking civilization) is not a 
sufficiently rigorous test of the general type of cognitive structure underlying these 
individual performances. Instead, the real capabilities of the structure-type can only 
be manifested by starting at square one. So, from the point of view of comparative 
total capabilities the 3T is still inadequate, since the artifact is supplied with a 
prefabricated stage on which to perform acts of post hoc imitation. And this sort of 
‘potted’ test could conceivably be passed by a well designed computational puppet, 
rather than by an instance of a robust and genuinely intelligent brand of cognitive 
organization (see my earlier discussion in Schweizer (1998) for allied points 
motivated by a different set of considerations). 
 
Incidentally, I think this explains why the standard science fiction scenario of an 
advanced alien life form, regardless of its chemical composition or internal processing 
structure, is always a more convincing hypothetical case of true intelligence than a 3T 
artifact. In contrast to a robot, the alien life form will have evolved its own 
sociolinguistic culture of native intelligence, in response to its primitive 
environmental stimuli, rather than simply exhibiting programmed capabilities 
simulating real intelligence in a pre-existing context for which it was tailor made by 
its designers. In this speculative case of an advanced alien life form, say Martians for 
convenience, the type of cognitive architecture in question would already have passed 
a 4T, as has the human race. Hence there is nothing species-centric about the 4T, and 
the intellectually and linguistically advanced Martians could pass the 4T 
independently of any association with particular human NL communities.   
 
Furthermore, the fact that the Martian race has already passed the 4T supplies a 
natural basis for then ascribing real intelligence and linguistic understanding to the 
individual Martians we might encounter. By acquiring their language via participation 
in a genuine, albeit alien, sociolinguistic medium, and causal interaction with their 
own local physical environment, individual Martian language use would thereby be 
semantically grounded. Hence a Martian who studied English as a second language on 
Mars would presumably be able to master and understand a great deal of  English, by 
translating this foreign language into its own semantically grounded 'native tongue'. 
Most likely there would be sufficiently many differences between Mars and Earth 
(and Martian and English) that there would be many things that it would not be able to 
grasp without first flying to Earth for a visit. But there is no reason to suppose that, 
once it had spent some time here and was sufficiently acquainted with our practices 
that it could not pass an extraterrestrial version of the 3T. And the appropriate 
conclusion to draw in such a case would be that the individual Martian possesses an 
authentic understanding of English.
8
                        
 
12.   Conclusion 
There is a profound difference between the historically manifested capabilities of the 
human cognitive type, as opposed to the standards incorporated in behavioral tests 
that merely scrutinize the ability of secluded artifacts to imitate the forms of behavior 
that we have already developed and sustained in response to much more basic 
environmental stimuli. And this crucial disparity in standards obtains even if tokens of 
the artificial type were to do as well or even better on the 2T or the 3T than individual 
humans. For example, even though we may take skilful chess playing in the case of 
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human beings as a sign of intelligence, we can nonetheless maintain that a chess 
playing program is not ‘genuinely intelligent’, irrespective of how well it plays chess. 
Skilful human chess players are members of the same cognitive kind that developed 
the overall social practice of game-playing, originated the game of chess itself, and 
then designed the program that now beats us at it. In contrast, the type of 
computational procedure to which the program belongs is capable of none of these 
prior achievements, even though it now wins the game. Similarly, it's quite 
conceivable that single instances of Dennett's robotic system could pass the 3T 
(because tailor made for this task), and yet the underlying cognitive architecture could 
fail miserably at the 4T. And again, the natural conclusion to draw would be that the 
type of system in question does not possess intelligence in a manner fully comparable 
with human beings. Instead, its behavioral successes are still essentially derivative, 
and parasitical upon the capacities and attainments of a fundamentally dissimilar 
cognitive type.  
 
So this points to a significant shift in conceptual perspective: a truly total test should 
focus on the capacities of the cognitive category as a whole, rather than on the 
performance of isolated tokens. The original 2T simply presupposes human NL and 
its associated cultural underpinnings as a precondition for the purely verbal imitation 
game. Although a vast improvement in many ways, the combined linguistic and 
robotic 3T still incorporates this intrinsic limitation, by again focussing on an artifact 
token, specifically designed to mimic the full range of intelligent human behaviour 
within a cultural network produced by a different category of cognitive agent 
altogether. But rather than consider the imitation of our intelligent behaviour by 
specially designed tokens, the criterion for a 4T should be whether an ongoing system 
of these artificial agents is capable of producing a comparable sociolinguistic medium 
of intelligence, starting from the same primitive environmental inputs as our pre-
linguistic forebears.
9
   
 
In summary, my main thesis is that even if a computational agent could pass the 3T, 
this would not be sufficient for the attribution of genuine  mental states and contents, 
unless it were semantically grounded in an actual sociolinguistic community and 
physical environment. Since it's conceivable that a cleverly designed robot might pass 
the 3T without this grounding, it follows that merely passing the 3T is not sufficient 
for the  attribution of genuine  mental states and contents. Furthermore, even if a robot 
passed the 3T and were semantically grounded (say, by learning English in the actual 
world and as part of an English speaking community), this would still not be a 
sufficient test for artificial intelligence on a par with humans, since the sociolinguistic 
medium presupposed by the 3T was produced by the human and not the artificial 
cognitive type. It's conceivable that tokens of the artificial cognitive type could pass 
the 3T and be semantically grounded,  while the artificial type itself is intrinsically 
incapable of producing and sustaining the essential and pre-existing  sociolinguistic 
medium of intelligence to which it is able to adapt.  Hence the need for a 4T to test the 
performance capacities at the type level. To count as a bona fide case of artificial 
mentality, the robotic cognitive type would have to demonstrate the capacity to 
produce its own sociolinguistic medium of intelligence, just like an advanced alien 
life form or the human race.   
 
Notes 
    1. See Harnad (2002) for a concise discussion/analysis of the CRA. 
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    2. Shieber (2007) provides a valiant and intriguing rehabilitation/defense of the 2T, 
but it nonetheless remains a 'bed-ridden' standard that neglects crucial behavioral data, 
such as mastery of salient language exit and entry rules. Ultimately Shieber's 
rehabilitation in terms of interactive proof requires acceptance of the notion that 
conversational input/response patters alone are sufficient, which premise I would 
deny for the reasons given. The program is still operating within a closed syntactic 
bubble. 
    3. Alternatively, Rapaport (2006) argues that human neuron firings are also just a 
form of uninterpreted syntax, so that what the homunculus Searle in the control room 
is doing is no different from what our brains do.  And if our brains understand natural 
language, then there's no reason to deny this of Searle in the room, at least not just 
because all he's doing is manipulating uninterpreted syntax. 
    4. For example, in (1984) and (1990) Searle makes some of the background 
machinery more explicit.    
    5. This fact, in the context of the 2T, is also noted in, e.g. Copeland (2001). 
    6. Interestingly, Turing considers the possibility that the best way to produce a 
machine able to pass the 2T might be to "follow the normal teaching of a 
child". However, when describing the 'child programme' he observes that "It will not 
be possible to apply exactly the same teaching process to the machine as to a normal 
child. It will not, for instance, be provided with legs ..." indicating that Turing, at this 
point, is speculating about a learning program, not a genuine robot (although he does 
subsequently conjecture about engineering enhancements, which seem to anticipate 
the robotic 3T).  
    7. This is perhaps comparable to a situation where unsuspecting earthlings crash 
land their space ship on Twin Earth. On day one they will still mean H2O when they 
utter the term ‘water’, since that's the native interpretation of their language. But after 
they've lived on Twin Earth for sometime and had sufficiently many interactions with 
environmental XYZ, and been integrated into their new sociolinguistic clan, they will 
enter a grey area, and it is plausible to hold that they will eventually become grounded 
in Twin Earth semantics and mean XYZ when they say ‘water’.  
    8. A similar but less extreme point holds in regard to human members of different 
native NL groups. Since we are all member of the same cognitive type the 4T is not 
an issue. So a French person who diligently studied English as a second language in 
Paris and then came to London would presumably be able to understand enough 
English to pass an English 3T. And this is because the French person is a member of 
the French sociolinguistic community, and hence is already semantically grounded in 
a human NL, and can thereby understand English by first translating it into French. So 
one might be able to learn a language 'purely syntactically', but only through the pre-
existence of a semantical foundation in some prior interpreted language. And clearly 
this is asymmetrical with the case of a newly assembled 3T robot. I would like to 
thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this (and the Martian learning English 
case) to my attention as potential objections to my view. 
    9. As with the 3T, the proposed test framework is quite futuristic (as even the 
original 2T is now turning out to have been), since the paper is not concerned with the 
practicalities of carrying out actual assessments, but rather with the operational 
standards which, in principle, are required to attain parity with the full range of data 
available in the human case. The evidence has taken tens of thousands of years to 
manifest itself, and we would have to somehow collapse the timeframe in order to 
apply the same standards to an artificial cognitive type. One possibility would be to 
use computer modelling to run ‘evolutionary’ scenarios in much faster than real time, 
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where simulations of communities of the artificial agents could perhaps yield answers 
about long term 4T capabilities.  
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